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Abstract: This article seeks to provide a theoretical 
account of how Indonesian Muslims have approached 
Islam and democracy. Historical analysis, combined with 
literary overview, is deployed to trace the empirical passage 
of Indonesian Muslims in developing discourses on 
democracy. This article argues that a widely-religion-based 
democracy is on the way of making. Following this process, 
discourses and counter-discourses on democracy are simply 
inevitable. The point of departure on which Muslims 
frequently disagree with each other is whether or not the 
type of Indonesian democracy should follow the path of 
Western secular democracy. Accordingly, three approaches 
following these lively discourses on democracy came into 
existence: First, the Huwaydian approach that claims the 
compatibility of Islam and democracy. Second, the 
Mawdudian approach that stands in an ambiguous position 
between rejecting and accepting democracy. Third, the 
Qutbian approach which argues that democracy is inimical 
to Islam by definition. Despite the risk of oversimplifica-
tion and conceptual discrepancy, the three terms are 
utilized merely for the purpose of sociological catego-
rization. 
Key words: Mawdudian, Qutbian, Huwaydian, Islamism, 
democracy. 
Introduction 
Many believe that Indonesia’s democracy is underway. The past 
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004, followed by massive 
regional elections for the positions of governor, regent and mayor all 
over the country, prove to be a promising sign of nascent Indonesian 
democracy. More importantly, this achievement is attributed to the 
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unique yet, to some extent, successful combination of Islam and 
democracy. There are some important figures deserve to be mentioned 
with regard to successfulness of the so-called Islam-based democracy, 
such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Ra’is, and so 
forth. They are not only considered to be able to develop positive 
discourses on democracy but also able to manufacture it on practical 
bases. The questions, however, would be: to what extent Indonesia can 
be called as a democratic country? Is there any historical or theological 
precedence to the successfulness of Indonesian democracy? How 
Muslims generally approach to democracy? 
In line with those questions, this article seeks to shed light on the 
conceptual definition of democracy in Indonesian context, followed by 
an overview of the empirical experience of democracy under both the 
New Order regime and the post-New Order one, and will be 
concluded by a brief discussion on Muslims’ approaches to democracy. 
The core concept developed throughout this article is that despite 
“illiberal” in nature, Indonesian Muslims are on the process of crafting 
democracy of their own based on a multifaceted mixture of social, 
historical and political capitals.  
Conceptualizing Democracy in Indonesian Context 
Defining democracy in Indonesian context is an arduous task. This 
can be understood from the fact that Indonesia proves to have shown 
a huge and complex variety of idiosyncrasy throughout its historical 
encounters with many external elements of the “outer” world which 
might be comparatively different from the Western concept of 
democracy. This is not to suggest that in order to understand 
democracy in this country one should be engaged in exceptionalist 
scholarship about the cultural specificity of Indonesia, for culture may 
not be inhospitable to democracy or good governance. The extent to 
which Indonesia is more or less receptive to democracy is not solely 
attributed to cultural factor as such, since one should also take such 
other variables as global and national political constellation into 
account. For sure, a single monolithic theoretical perspective won’t 
undoubtedly be of the advantage to fully understand the trajectory of 
democracy in this world’s largest Muslim-majority country. This notion 
reminds us to what Ghassan Salamé has pointed out in his Democracy 
without Democrats that there may not be many democrats in the Muslim 
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world, but that does not render the idea of democracy irrelevant or 
indefensible.1  
At this point, one may assume that democracy in Indonesia is 
underway or in transition towards democracy, despite the winding and 
sinuous road this country will have to go through, a general route that 
most, if not all, countries travel during democratization process.2 A 
transition approach thus might see the likelihood of Indonesia’s 
democracy as just a matter of time, on the condition that this country 
can succeed in passing through several critical phases.3 Viewed from 
this perspective, it is widely believed that Indonesia is in a historic 
period of transition from authoritarian rule to democratic political 
governance. Apart from the destructive excesses democracy might 
bring about such as ethnic and religious conflicts and regional 
separatism, the transition to a more democratic order has opened up 
unprecedented freedom, giving the Indonesian people for the first time 
a choice to elect their own leaders and the liberty to organize 
themselves based on their own preferences.4 
                                                 
1 Ghassan Salamé, “Introduction: Where are the Democrats?,” in Ghassan Salamé 
(ed.), Democracy without Democrats: The Renewal of Muslim Politics? (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1995), p. 3. 
2 See, for example, R.W. Liddle, “Indonesia’s Democratic Transition: Playing by the 
Rules,” in A. Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), pp. 373-99; Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiman (eds.), Indonesia: the 
Uncertain Transition (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2001); and Abubakar E. 
Hara, “The Difficult Journey of Democratization in Indonesia,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 23, No. 2 (Aug 2001), pp. 307-26.  
3 According Dankwart Rustow, there are four phases a given country should be 
engaged before a democracy comes into being in the first place. First, the phase of 
national unity at what time the concept of a state is being formed or revisited. Second, 
inconclusive political struggle which can sometimes be so intense that it could tear 
national unity apart or cause one group to become so powerful that it overwhelms the 
opposition, concludes the [inconclusive] political struggle, and closes off the route to 
democracy. Third, first transition or decision phase, a historical moment when the 
parties to the inconclusive political struggle decide to compromise and adopt 
democratic rules which gives each some share in the polity. Fourth, there is the second 
transition or habituation phase when a democratic regime may be said to be firmly 
established. For further discussion on this issue, see, Dankwart Rustow, “Transition to 
Democracy,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 2 (April 1970), pp. 337-63.  
4 Baladas Ghoshal, “Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post-
Soeharto Indonesia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, No. 3 (2004), pp. 506-29. 
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It is clear that at one aspect, the collapse of the authoritarian 
regime of Suharto’s New Order in May 1998 proves to have displayed 
a promising dawn for Indonesia’s democracy. Many have predicated 
this political transition as the era of reformasi (reformation era), 
signifying a replacement of the old corporatist-centralized-authoritarian 
political system with a new democratic order.5 Liberalization of politics 
by means of free and fair general election which allows wider access of 
political participation of the grass-roots is one of the most evident 
features of the establishment of democracy institution in this country.  
Viewed from the “minimalist” definition of [electoral] democracy, 
Indonesia may be categorized as a democratic country due to its ability 
to manage past two consecutive free and fair general elections in 1999 
and 2004.6 In this context, it is not exaggerated that this democratic 
mechanism has led to the birth of Indonesia as the world’s third largest 
democracy.7 Despite this successful story, many are less optimistic 
about the future of democracy in the country. The questions would be: 
what type of democracy is likely to take shape in the country? Does the 
ouster of Suharto’s dictatorship regime of the New Order by design 
guarantee the anchoring of democratic elements and institutions? Or, 
would democracy be employed by predatory demagogues to launch 
and execute their megalomaniac political ambitions and agenda? As 
political and social changes in this country proved to be very slow in 
response to the global demands of democratization, the answers to 
these questions remain so far uncertain.  
It is within those complex and uneasy issues such pessimism 
emerges at various degrees. A few but significant scholarly studies on 
the trajectory of democracy in Indonesia seem to share this pessimism. 
The replacement of the New Order regime with a more democratic 
order is often viewed cynically as pouring “new wine in the old 
                                                 
5 See, Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury (eds.), Reformasi: Crises 
and Change in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1999). 
6 The successful story of 2004 general election has been described a headline of 
respected newspaper of London, The Economist, as a “shining example” of Indonesia. 
See, “Leaders: Indonesia’s Shining Example,” The Economist, Vol. 372 (Jul 10, 2004), p. 
10. 
7 Olle Törnquist, “Dynamics of Indonesian Democratisation,” Third World Quarterly 21, 
No. 3 (2000), p. 406. 
  
 
Masdar Hilmy 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 01, Number 01, June 2007 
46 
bottle”.8 The shift mentality in Indonesian politics seems to go 
nowhere from the old paradigm in a way that the replacement of the 
old regime does not nurture a fertile ground for democracy in its 
“liberal” sense. The emergence of democracy seeds in this country is 
undervalued by many as a new cleavage of the same essence. At this 
point, explicating the seemingly gloomy picture of democracy in the 
country should first of all be situated in ceaseless attempts at defining 
what sort of democracy will be viable in Indonesian context with all of 
its complexity. 
One of the most obvious burdens for Indonesia in developing 
democracy concerns not only with the authoritarian image of the past 
which is not easy to eradicate, but also with such a stereotypical image 
of culturalist viewpoint that Indonesia is unlikely to achieve democracy 
simply because this country represents the largest Muslim community 
in the world. Volpi, for instance, basing himself on Diamond’s 
theoretical construct, sees the phenomenon of the emergence of 
democracy in the Muslim world as a “pseudo-democracy,” a salient 
political reality he describes as “a political order that tries to look like a 
liberal democracy without trying to becoming one.”9 The reason 
behind this phenomenon is that, he argues, “by mimicking democracy 
the powers-that-be are able to secure a domestic advantage that they 
could not obtain otherwise—i.e. by being either fully democratic or 
fully authoritarian.”10 
Nevertheless, while acknowledging instrumental rationales 
contributing to the formation of pseudo-democracy such as the lack of 
democratic institutions and mechanisms, Volpi concludes that viewing 
democratization in the Muslim world solely from this perspective can 
quickly become counterproductive. This is in large part to the 
existence of a universal drive that favors essentialist definitions of 
democracy without necessarily trapped in Western liberal sense. In his 
definition, “pseudo-democracy” is not a down-graded form of liberal 
                                                 
8 For a succinct discussion on the legacy of the New Order in the transition era, see, 
for example, Vedi Hadiz, “Retrieving the past for the future? Indonesia and the New 
Order legacy,” Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, vol. 28, no. 2 (2000), pp. 10-33. 
9 Frédéric Volpi, “Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World,” Third World Quarterly 25, 
No. 6 (2004), pp. 1061-1078. For further discussion on Diamond’s “pseudo-
democracy” theory, see, Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of 
Democracy, 13, No. 2 (2002), pp. 21-35. 
10 Volpi, “Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World,” p. 1063. 
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democracy, but it should be appreciated as a stepping-stone towards 
the construction of a different kind of democracy –be it republican, 
theocratic or Islamic.11 The theoretical description of the Indonesian 
pseudo-democracy coincides with what Larbi Sadiki refers to as 
“façade democracy,” a condition rampant in most of the Muslim world 
in which electoral democracy is not accompanied at the same time by 
civic engagement, law enforcement, alternation of power, freedom of 
press and organization.12  
On the basis of comparative analysis of the Turkish and 
Indonesian cases, Volpi found that one of the contributing factors 
behind the slow movement towards democracy in the Muslim world is 
the internal constraint, in the sense that both the elites and the 
populace remain attracted to non-liberal democratic discourses and 
practices. In Indonesia, this paradigmatic stalemate could be clearly 
observed in the reluctance of pre-university students to turn their 
allegiance from the ideology of Demokrasi Pancasila to liberal 
democracy.13 As we might have noticed, Demokrasi Pancasila has been 
fossilized, mystified, and deployed as a full-fledged ideological 
justification of the authoritarian regime of Suharto’s New Order. 
Under this political order, opposition is considered unnecessary since 
decisions are made in consensus. The ruling government imposed a 
stringent ideological consciousness to the ruled by means of systematic 
political hegemony that unity and order is much more important than 
pluralism and accountability. The leader is supposed to be the paternal 
figure that maintains political order, economic prosperity, national 
stability and social harmony.14 
The persistence of status-quo ideology and polity seems to suggest 
a glaring reluctance of Indonesia marching towards a new democracy. 
A close examination to the problems and complexities besieging two 
                                                 
11 Ibid, p. 1075. 
12 Larbi Sadiki, “Political Liberalization in Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Façade Democracy,” 
Democratization 9, No. 4 (Winter 2002), pp. 122-141. 
13 Mary Fearnley-Sander, et. al., “Political Learning during Reformasi,” Australian 
Journal of Political Science, 36, Vol. 2 (2001), pp. 325-346, as cited by Volpi, “Pseudo-
Democracy in the Muslim World,” p. 1073. 
14 For a helpful account on Demokrasi Pancasila, see, for instance, Hans Antlöv, 
“Demokrasi Pancasila and the Future of Ideology in Indonesia,” in Hans Antlöv  and 
Tak-Wing Ngo (eds.), The Cultural Construction of Politics in Asia (Richmond: Curzon 
Press, 2000), pp. 203-22. 
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consecutive general elections of the 1999 and 2004 would justify this 
pessimism. Vedi Hadiz, for instance, on the basis of a close 
observation in two local cities of Indonesia, i.e. Yogyakarta and 
Medan, came to suggest that all types of problems of the general 
election such as money politics, vote buying, and the coalition of 
political gangster (preman politik) and black capital holders is not the 
price to liberal democracy, but the rationale of the existence of a 
“something else”—a non-liberal type of democracy driven by money 
politics and thuggery—that is already entrenched, and the variations of 
which can readily be found elsewhere.”15 He labeled the type of 
democracy having been developed in Indonesian polity as “illiberal 
democracy,” a sort of democracy in disguise, not democracy itself.16 
Different from what the above-mentioned scholars’ viewpoint on 
Indonesia’s democracy, Vali Nasr argues that something called 
“Muslim Democracy” has been blossoming since the early 1990s in a 
number of Muslim-majority countries—all, interestingly, outside the 
Arab world—such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and 
Turkey.17 It should be noted that Nasr is of the proponent of the 
compatibility between Islam and democracy, although he does not 
provide an accurate measure of how and what type of democracy is 
likely to come into existence in the Muslim world. Nevertheless, he 
argues that Muslim Democracy is not particularly driven by an abstract, 
meticulously considerate theological and ideological accommodation 
between Islam and democracy, but rather by a pragmatic synthesis that 
is emerging in much of the Muslim world in response to the 
opportunities and demands produced by the ballot box. Parties have 
no choice except for making compromises and down-to-earth 
decisions in order to make the most of their own political performance 
be of advantageous in gaining their constituents’ interests under 
democratic rules of the game.18 In accordance with this pragmatic 
ideal, Nasr describes Muslim Democracy in Indonesian context as 
                                                 
15 Vedi R. Hadiz, “Reorganizing Political Power in Indonesia,” The Pacific Review 16, 
No. 4 (2003), p. 607. 
16 Vedi R. Hadiz, “The Rise of neo-Third Worldism? The Indonesian Trajectory and 
Consolidation of Illiberal Democracy,” Third World Quarterly 25, No. 1 (2004), pp. 55-
71. 
17 Vali Nasr, “The Rise of ‘Muslim Democracy,’” Journal of Democracy 16, No. 2 (April 
2005), pp. 13-27. 
18 Ibid, p. 15. 
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“less a platform and more a space wherein a number of parties are 
struggling to strike the right balance between secular politics and 
Muslim values.”19  
The rationale behind the success of Muslim Democracy, Nasr 
argues, can easily be found in regular competitive elections that have 
pushed Islamic parties toward pragmatism and pulled other parties into 
more hard-working attempts at epitomizing Muslim interests. The 
domino effect of such a contest is to reward moderation which is to 
win the middle ground. Democratic competition over the Muslim 
voters requires Muslim parties to incorporate all elements of the 
electorate, either those who vote based on Muslim values or those 
secular-minded voters, unified under broader platforms and wider 
coalitions which are more or less pragmatic in nature. This condition is 
what Nasr depicts as the “triumph of practice over theory and perhaps 
of the political over the Islamic.”20 He adds that the future of Muslim 
politics seems to belong to those who can address to Muslim moral 
values, but within the framework of political platforms in democratic 
settings. Finally, it is believed that only Muslim Democracy can 
provide the Muslim world with the promise of moderation. Facing the 
dynamic of Muslim Democracy, Islamists will likely to find themselves 
caught up in a hard-rock of changing their ideological vision or 
suffering from marginalization.  
Anies Rasyid Baswedan, on the basis of a close examination on 
what he calls “Political Islam,” proposes a similar argument with that 
of Vali Nasr regarding the trajectory of Muslim polity in Indonesia. In 
his view, different from the political orientation of the 1950s era, since 
the collapse of the Suharto’s New Order “Muslims” [the inverted 
commas are his] have become more pragmatic in their politics by 
focusing more on the policy level than on the state’s philosophical 
foundation.21 Taking this notion into consideration, one would be 
misleading to assume that Islamic political parties in this country are 
persistently committed to incorporating the Islamic Shari >‘ah into the 
body of the state. The shift in agenda and vision among Islamic 
political parties from ideological-Islamic to substantial-pragmatic 
                                                 
19 Ibid, p.17. 
20 Ibid, p. 26. 
21 Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future 
Trajectory,” Asian Survey, Vol. XLIV, No. 5 (September /October 2004), pp. 669-690. 
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signifies the paradigmatic shift of Muslims’ political orientation as a 
whole, albeit the obstinate outlooks of some Islamist fringes outside 
the sphere of politics.22  
Given some remarkable achievements in developing democracy, 
internationally speaking, Indonesia is considered as “semi-democracy,” 
a category used by World Values Survey to describe forty-seven 
countries around the globe that have experienced democracy for less 
than twenty years and have current Freedom House rating of 3.5 to 
5.5.23 Freedom House describes them as “partly-free” (others use the 
terms “transitional” or consolidating” democracies), to indicate that 
the given countries do not fully subscribe to “full-fledged 
democracy.”24 Despite the fact that the survey findings are always 
subject to debate and criticism, it is indeed difficult to deny the slow 
movement of democratization in Indonesia due to its complex 
challenges and constraints. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
survey dealt with empirical analysis on the basis of measurable 
procedures and standards, not with religion in normative sense. As a 
result, the assumption that Islam, as a majority religion in Indonesia, 
should be responsible for the slow process of democratization is 
theoretically unfounded. 
                                                 
22 Such a paradigm shift has been acknowledged by R. William Liddle, “New Patterns 
of Islamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia,” in Amy McCreedy (ed.), Piety and 
Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
International Center, Asia Special Report, no. 10, 2003). 
23 There are four categories used by Freedom House to measure the length of 
democratic stability all countries around the world. Under the first category, “older 
democracies,” are thirty-nine countries with at least twenty years’ continuous 
experience of democracy from 1980 to 2000 and have Freedom House rating   of 5.5 
to 7.0. The second countries are called “newer democracies” comprising forty-three 
countries with less than twenty years’ experience of democracy which have the most 
recent Freedom House rating of 5.5 to 7.0. The third is “semi democracies” consisting 
of forty-seven countries with less than twenty years’ experience of democracy which 
have the most recent Freedom House rating   of 3.5 to 5.5. And the last, forth, 
category is called “non-democracies,” consisting of the remaining sixty-two countries, 
with the Freedom House rating in 1999-2000 from 1.0 to 3.0. Under this categories are 
military-backed dictatorships, authoritarian countries, elitist oligarchies, and absolute 
monarchies. See, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and 
Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 52.  
24 Societies are defined based on the annual ratings provided by the Freedom House 
since 1972. The level of freedom is classified according to the combined mean score 
for political rights and civil liberties in its annual survey, Freedom in the World. Its full 
report can be accessed at: www.freedomhouse.org.  
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Democracy under the New Order Regime 
During Suharto’s New Order, there is no further betterment of the 
qualitative efforts of democratization process in a substantial sense. 
Suharto has indeed fairly successful in bringing Indonesia from a 
severe economic crises inherited by his predecessor into a more stable 
country.25 Nevertheless, Suharto is considered to have failed in 
building the infrastructures of democracy, and he even has abused 
democracy through his authoritarian power. He has masked his 
authoritarianism by means of what his regime called “Demokrasi 
Pancasila,” assuming a full-fledged combination between democracy 
and Indonesian values as embedded in Pancasila principles.26 Pancasila 
had been a single lethal mantra of this regime to crush any type of 
political resistance and opposition. Through this concept, Suharto 
introduced the principle of “mono-loyalty” (asas mono-loyalitas) among 
Indonesian citizens. Suharto has never hesitated to arrest those who 
showed unwillingness to fuse into his regime and send them into jail. 
He, systematically with his regime, would stigmatize all his political 
opponents as being anti-Pancasila or not Pancasilais. Demokrasi 
Pancasila had been abused to curtail true democratic values and throw 
them into a garbage bin. Suharto has failed to restore his previous 
rotten regime and he was even trapped in maintaining Sukarno’s 
dictatorship. 
Be that as it may, outside the power circle emerged a positive 
awareness towards democracy. As Hefner aptly noted, “there were 
always Muslim intellectuals who took a less pessimistic view of the 
New Order government.”27 Some Muslim intellectuals have tried to 
formulate a theological basis for democratic civility based on their 
normative roots. Amin Rais deserves special mention when he, for the 
first time, made an open statement that there is no such an Islamic 
state.28 This blatant statement had been further buttressed by some 
                                                 
25 See, for instance, Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability 
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000.  
26 For a helpful account the New Order’s perception on Pancasila, see, among others, 
Michael Morfit, “Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to The New 
Order Government,” Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 8 (August 1981), pp. 838-51. 
27 Robert W. Hefner, “Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia,” in Robert W. 
Hefner (ed.), Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 79. 
28 See, Amin Rais, “Tidak Ada Negara Islam,” Panji Masyarakat, no. 376/1982. 
  
 
Masdar Hilmy 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 01, Number 01, June 2007 
52 
leading Muslim intellectuals such as Mohammad Roem and Nurcholish 
Madjid, when he was away in the US taking his PhD program, through 
a more confirmed statement that there is no Islamic state.29 Rais’ 
statement triggered a new awareness among young Muslims not to 
romanticize in an Islamic-Golden-Age-imagination of the past. In 
forging democratic discourse, Rais’ initiation laid a crucial base for 
further positive discourse on democracy among his contemporaneous 
counterparts. Since that time, the ideas of democracy have flourished 
very rapidly among intellectual Muslims such as Abdurrahman Wahid, 
Johan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib, Dawam Rahardjo, Aswab Mahasin, and 
still many others.30  
During his power, Suharto tried to domesticate “political Islam” 
through the incorporation of Muslims into his political circle by 
sponsoring the establishment of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim 
se-Indonesia, Association of Muslim Intellectuals of Indonesia) which 
was formed in December 1990.31 ICMI has quickly become a full-
railway coach filled by a huge flock of Muslim bureaucrats and 
technocrats, rather than intellectuals. Led by Habibie, a leading 
technocrat of Suharto’s most trusted right hand person, ICMI had 
been one the main backbones of Suharto’s centralized and corporatist 
regime, in addition to military and Golkar party. Due to this reason, 
the establishment of ICMI had been severely criticized by some 
leading intellectuals such as Deliar Noer, Ridwan Saidi, Djohan 
Effendi and Abdurrahman Wahid as being sectarian, exclusivist, elitist 
and abusive to noble values of Islam.32 Instead of pioneering the 
intensification of democratization process, in its further development, 
ICMI to a great extent proves to have contributed to exacerbating the 
decay of power morality. This situation led several leading intellectuals 
such as Amin Rais and Emha Ainun Najib withdrew from ICMI on 
                                                 
29 Their Tidak Ada Negara Islam is basically a response to what Amin Rais has provoked 
previously that there is no Islamic state in Islam through a mutual correspondence 
between Roem and Madjid. 
30 Aswab Mahasin, Menyemai Kultur Demokrasi (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2000). 
31 On the background of ICMI establishment, see, Hefner, “Islamization and 
Democratization in Indonesia,” especially pp. 94-102; cf.  Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, 
State, and Civil Society: ICMI and The Struggle for The Indonesian Middle Class,” 
Indonesia, no. 56 (1993), pp. 1-35.  
32 Hefner, “Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia,” p. 100. 
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the grounds that this organization had been mistreated as a means of 
maintaining Suharto’s power and the interests of limited people. 
Democracy under the Post New Order Regime 
Indonesia in the post-Suharto era has witnessed the shattering of 
democratic seeds painstakingly developed by Muslim intellectuals 
throughout the New Order regime. The political situation following 
the ouster of Suharto has once been uncertain, filled up with zero-
sum-game violent acts perpetrated by those powers-that-be 
presumably disillusioned with the unprecedented shift of power 
structure. The movement of democratization stalled for sometime with 
the outbreak of bitter factional squabbles among political elites and 
horizontal communal conflicts between Christians and Muslims in 
several parts of the country.33 The elite factionalism and communal 
conflicts in this era had complex genealogies. Nevertheless, the more 
immediate assumption on these tensions was Suharto’s 
mismanagement of the diversity and heterogeneity of society. 
According to some observers, one of which is Hefner, instead of 
building a consensus on the terms of citizenship, “Suharto’s New Orde 
regime kept contenders for power off balance by playing rival ethnic, 
religious, and ideological groups against each other.”34 As a result, 
there was an enormous gap in terms of primordial identity among the 
members of society which later on stimulated those horizontal 
tensions.35  
The two consecutive general elections (1999 and 2004) had been 
much hoped to provide a smart solution for multidimensional crises 
                                                 
33 For a discussion on ethno-religious conflicts in some of the eastern parts of 
Indonesia, see, among others, Gerry van Klinken, “The Maluku Wars: Bringing Society 
Back In,” Indonesia 71 (April 2001), pp. 1-26; cf. Jacques Bertrand, “Legacies of the 
authoritarian past: Religious violence in Indonesia's Moluccan Islands,” Pacific Affairs, 
Vol. 75, Iss. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 57-85. 
34 Robert W. Hefner, “Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence in Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia,” in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, 
Democratization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 276. 
35 The institutionalist approach deployed by Jacques Bertrand is particularly useful to 
remap the anatomy of horizontal conflicts during and post-The New Order Regime. 
This study reveals that mass violence and horizontals conflicts during the New Order 
regime and following the ouster of Suharto is a state-sponsored crime. For further 
account on this, see, Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Port 
Melbourne and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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and a smooth embarking spot for democratization process. Despite 
low, there are positive changes in the landscape of politics. In this 
regard, Rasyid Anies Baswedan identifies four significant changes in 
the political environment of Indonesia especially since the 1999 
election. First is greater political awareness of Muslim voters not to 
cast their vote on the basis of ideological preferences, but much 
pragmatic. Second is the impact of what he calls as “staggered 
elections.” This has to do with changes in the Electoral Law which 
allow the presidential and general elections to be held separately. Third 
is the effect of decentralization launched since 1999 that contributes to 
the shaping of local politics. And fourth is in relation to Muslim voters’ 
agreement with the general idea of Islamic government and Shari >‘ah 
which, on the basis of the 2002 PPIM nationwide survey, seems to 
reflect a degree of ambivalence of Muslim attitudes. On the one hand, 
the Muslim respondents conform on the general idea of adopting 
Shari >‘ah but at the same time dispute how it should be implemented.36  
In post-Suharto era, the political orientation of Political Islam is 
not merely represented by parties that support formalization of the 
Shari >‘ah in the structure of the state, but more strikingly, also by those 
that support a non-religion-based state but welcome the incorporation 
of Islamic values and “Muslim” aspirations into government policy.37 
Baswedan’s general depiction of the current Political Islam can be used 
as a token to estimate the potential, factuality and trajectory of 
democracy in Indonesia. This leads to a preliminary assumption that 
political pendulum might have swung to a different direction from that 
of the 19950s and the New Order regime. As we might have known, 
the concept of democracy in those two regimes subjected very much 
to the manipulation and construction of the ruling elites, giving no 
choice to the ruled except receiving whatever political decisions had 
been made by the first. Since the ouster of Suharto onwards, the 
situation has significantly changed into different direction. The face of 
Political Islam in Indonesia has been diversified. Political liberalization 
has not only resulted in free and fair general election, but also in 
freedom of expression and political participation in a broader context. 
 
                                                 
36 Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia,” p. 683. 
37 Ibid, p. 679. 
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Three Approaches to Democracy 
The extent to which democracy is regarded a legitimate concept to 
adopt in Islam has been heatedly debated amongst Indonesian 
Muslims particularly since the independence day (1945). Muslims’ view 
on democracy can be seen in their response to whether or not 
Indonesia should adopt an Islamic state or secular one. This means 
that to explain the Muslims’ approaches to democracy means, among 
other things, to trace their views and understandings of the 
relationship between Islam and the state. For almost six decades, the 
relationship between Islam and the state has been a major prism 
through which observers portrayed Muslims’ conception of 
democracy. Another variable which is not less important seems to be 
missing in their discussion: explaining democracy through the prism of 
public realm. In this regard, Hefner’s Civil Islam must be appreciated as 
a spearheading study that tries to examine Indonesia’s democracy 
through this prism given despite the fact that his main focus is the 
concept of civil society, and not democracy itself.  
Since the independence of Indonesia, democracy has meant many 
things for Muslims. It is no wonder that we may find an enormous 
diversity of views among them regarding the concept of democracy. A 
large variety of Muslims’ approach to democracy is caused by a large 
variety of their cultural and educational backgrounds. In general, there 
are three main views regarding the democracy; the first view may be 
called as Huwaydian approach which accommodates democracy in a 
wider room. This camp views democracy more liberally and 
substantially in the sense that Islam is in itself contains the very 
democratic elements. This camp is represented by some liberal thinkers 
such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid, Munawir Syadzali, 
and so forth. The second approach may be called Mawdudian which 
stands in between. On the one hand they reject the concept of 
democracy on the grounds that it represents a non-Islamic origin. On 
the other hand, they want to base their government on democratic 
structures and principles. This view is called Mawdudian because it is 
mainly inspired by Mawdudi’s concept of theocracy with its derivatives 
in Indonesia such as theo-democracy,38 Islamo-democracy,39 Theistic 
                                                 
38 This is Mohammad Natsir’s term to denote that Islam can be democratic in certain 
extent. This notion will be discussed later on in this article. 
39 Anas Urbaningrum, Islamo-demokrasi: Pemikiran Nurcholish Madjid (Jakarta: Penerbit 
Republika, 2004). 
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Democracy (Demokrasi Teistik),40 Religious Democracy,41 and so on. 
This view is represented by Masyumi with its leaders like Muhammad 
Natsir. It is reminiscent of totalitariantic view of Mawdudi who was 
obsessed with giving the state the sense of the sacred or Islamic. The 
third approach is Qutbian in which democracy is considered as “alien” 
to Islam and, therefore, the proponents of this approach reject 
democracy with all of its sorts and derivatives. Their perception of 
democracy is totalistic, clear-cut, and black-and-white: it belongs to 
ka>fir (unbelievers) system. This school of thought is represented by 
most of the Islamists, either in political wing or cultural one.  
It is noteworthy that in the formative period (post-independent), 
almost all Muslims viewed democracy in the way mentioned above. 
This is because they were so obsessed with establishing an Islamic 
state, a state which was based on the Qur’an and Hadith.42 In its future 
development, they have been ramified into many branches and streams 
owing largely to the inclusive exposure and encounter of their younger 
generations’ with such Western concepts as democracy. The education 
they have gone through has given significant influence in the shift 
paradigm among Muslims. Their familiarity with such a Western 
concept have brought about a significant changes among the younger 
generations of Masyumi and NU which were previously conservative 
enough in responding the concept of democracy. 
Huwaydian Approach 
This approach is attributed to Fahmi Huwaydi’s liberal standpoints 
of democracy in Islam.43 Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur) is of the 
vigorous proponent of the view that Islam is democratic in nature.44 
                                                 
40 A. M. Fatwa, Demokrasi Teistis: Upaya Merangkai Integrasi Politik dan Agama Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Gramedia, 2001). 
41 Idris Thaha, Demokrasi Religius: Pemikiran Politik Nurcholish Madjid dan M. Amien Rais 
(Jakarta: Teraju, 2004).  
42 This fact is particularly interesting in relation to Boland’s evaluation of the Muslim 
representatives in the BPUPKI such as Wahid Hasyim and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo. It 
is of course quite surprising to see the fact that Wahid Hayim, Abdurrahman Wahid’s 
father, was seen by Boland as the most radical among Muslim representatives. See, 
Boland, The Struggle of Islam, p. 29. 
43 See, Fahmi Huwaydi, Al-Isla >m wa al-Dimu >qra >t }i>yyah (Cairo: Mu’assasa al-Ahram, 1993). 
44 Due to his progressive ideas on Islamic renewal, Madjid –together with 
Abdurrahman Wahid-- is classified by many as a neo-modernist Muslim thinker. See, 
Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam:Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam 
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He has stood toe-to-toe in constructing a firm theological basis for the 
compatibility of Islam with democracy.45 He views democracy not only 
in the level of state structure (i.e., democracy as a constitutional habit) 
but also in the level of public life (i.e., democracy as the habit of 
individual Muslim’s heart). He maintains that democracy is the most 
invaluable inheritance of human being and there is no other alternative 
which is considered more superior than democracy.46 At the level of 
state structure, Madjid proposes the application of democracy in its 
liberal sense, in which the mechanism of checks and balances is 
maintained to avoid the abuse of power among the rulers and to 
safeguard the right of minority. In this regard, democracy, in his view, 
necessitates a legal opposition in a positive sense: not only to oppose, 
but also to counterbalance and support the ruling government.47 At 
cultural level, Madjid further argues, democracy is no longer a noun, 
but a verb, signifying a process of democratization. Most likely inspired 
by Robert N. Bellah’s Beyond Belief, Madjid maintains that democracy 
must be put into practice as a habitual act of heart. In this sense, 
democracy is considered as a way of life of civilized citizens with 
several points as follows: the principle of heterogeneity awareness, 
public deliberation, means justifies ends, a honest agreement, 
economic fulfillment and accurate social plan, pure freedom, and the 
need for democratic education and education of democracy.48 
In formulating the theological construct of democracy, Madjid 
refers to the roots of textual sources of Islam, both normative and 
historical. One of Madjid’s most often cited reference is Muhammad’s 
exemplary model of Madinan covenant (al-mi >tha>q al-madi >nah) to which 
                                                                                                      
Masa Orde Baru (Bandung: Mizan, 1986), pp. 176-77; cf. Abdullah Saeed, “Ijtihad and 
Innovation in Neo-Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia,” Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1997), pp. 279-295. 
45 Nurcholish Madjid, “Kepemimpinan Demokrasi Lebih Dekat dengan Islam,” 
Tsaqafah, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2004): pp. 78-81. 
46 Nurcholish Madjid, “Demokrasi dan Demokratisasi di Indonesia: Beberapa Panda-
ngan Dasar dan Prospek pelaksanaannya sebagai Kelanjutan Logis Pembangunan 
Nasional,” in Elza Peldi Taher (ed.), Demokratisasi Politik, Budaya, dan Ekonomi: 
Pengalaman Indonesia Masa Orde Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994), p. 217. 
47 Nurcholish Madjid, Dialog Keterbukaan (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), pp. 5-59. 
48 Nurcholish Madjid, “Transisi ke Demokrasi,” in Fatsoen Tekad No. 16/year 1 (15-21 
Feburary 1999); cf. Madjid, “Demokrasi Dinamis,” in Fatsoen Tekad No. 2/year 1(9-6 
November 1999), as cited by Syukron Kamil, Islam dan Demokrasi: Telaah Konseptual dan 
Historis (Jakarta: Gaya Media Pratama, 2002), p. 83 (f. 39).  
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Robert N. Bellah refers to as too advanced for Muhammad’s era.49 
That is why Arab people, initiated by Mu’awiyah, the first caliph of the 
Umayyad caliphate, ceased to subscribe on to this political ethics 
simply because it is highly sophisticated for them. This political 
practice is viewed as the highest manifestation of commitment in mass 
involvement and participation for all of the members of society and 
the inclusiveness of its leaders based on their achievements evaluated 
in universal standards. This is because Muhammad himself, as Ibn 
Taymiyyah argues, only ma's}u >m (infallible) in his position as God’s 
messenger, and not as an individual which is manifested in the 
succession of his leadership on the basis of public deliberation, not 
family lineage.50  
This practice, Bellah argues, is not a-historical ideological 
fabrication, because its roots can be traced until today through the 
Qur’an, Hadith as well as the Madinan covenant. Bellah claims that the 
Madinan covenant is the first document throughout the history of 
human being which is said to have ever laid the foundations for 
pluralism and tolerance. In this covenant it is acknowledged that all 
citizens of Madinah were equal before the law regardless their 
difference in religion and race, united in one community tied by the 
same rights and responsibilities such as freedom of religion and the 
responsibility of defending the state. What Madjid means by pluralism 
is the principle of heterogeneity which he receives as a taken for 
granted fact (sunnah Alla>h, natural law) and has positive values as well 
as the necessity for the sake of human’s safe (Q.S. 2:251). While what 
he means by tolerance is not only restricted to the inner tolerance, but 
also outer tolerance with its more positive outlooks towards the 
religious others as religion consisting of salvation mission (Q.S. 3: 
113).51 
                                                 
49 For further discussion on Bellah’s view of Islam, see his book, Beyond Belief: Essays on 
Religion in a Post-Traditional World (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, 
1970), especially pp. 146-67. 
50 See, his doctoral thesis on Ibn Taymiyya, “Ibn Taymiyya on Kala >m and Falsafa (A 
Problem of Reason and Revelation in Islam),” (Unpublished Dissertation, Chicago: 
The University Of Chicago, 1984). 
51 Nurcholish Madjid, “Asas-asas Pluralisme dan Toleransi dalam Masyarakat Madani,” 
a paper delivered at the seminar “Masyarakat Madani dalam Perspektif Agama dan 
Politik,” Jakarta, 22 February 1999, as cited by Syukron Kamil, Islam dan Demokrasi, p. 
83. 
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On the basis of Madinan covenant, Madjid is convinced that there 
is no need to establish an Islamic state, because the purpose of the 
state is to uphold justice by preserving the rights of individual and at 
the same time respecting the freedom of others.52 In his view, the crux 
of the participation concept lies in the notion that the sovereignty 
belongs to people. It is within this framework that participation 
contains the very meaning of freedom and liberty, as mandated by the 
Constitution 1945. The importance of people sovereignty indicates 
that it is only through the participation of people can the state’s ideals 
be accomplished. Without people participation, all state’s ideals will 
mean nothing. While the sovereignty of the state, Madjid argues, is the 
continuum of the sovereignty of the people, the sovereignty of the 
people is the continuum of the sovereignty of individual in fulfilling 
his/her own decisions in all aspects of life.53  
In supporting his arguments, Madjid refers to Ibn Taymiyyah’s 
concept of justice that God endorses the just government albeit un-
Islamic and does not endorse a corrupt government albeit Islamic. For 
Madjid, the most important thing to do with regard to upholding 
justice is its economic aspect, where each individual has the same 
proportion of wealth access. It seems that Madjid is of the proponent 
of a democratic welfare state.54 Madjid also bases his arguments of 
democracy on the Qur’an 1:6 in which God says: “Ihdina> al-s }ira>t } al-
mustaqi >m” (Show us the straight way). In his opinion, Islam considers 
Man as having a fundamentally positive and optimistic nature (fit }rah), 
while at the same time having potential shortcomings. The Qur’an and 
Hadith guide Man, but this is in general form, not in detailed matters; 
and these give no explanation of how to implement this guide. For the 
detailed and practical matters, Man is required to conduct ijtiha>d 
(independent reasoning). As a social mechanism, the ijtiha>d can 
produce democracy which certainly implies deliberation and 
arguments. Because of Man’s limitation, the ijtiha>d must be conducted 
collectively and democratically, especially in matters pertaining to 
                                                 
52 Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem, Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-surat Politik 
Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1997), especially pp. 12-
43. 
53 Nurcholish Madjid, Cita-cita Politik Islam Era Reformasi (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), p. 
197. 
54 Syukron Kamil, Islam dan Demokrasi, p. 70. 
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public affairs, and by asking God to guide the participants to the 
“straight way.”55 
Abdurrahman Wahid, the fourth president of Indonesia, is another 
important Muslim figure who propagates the viability of Islam and 
democracy in its liberal sense.56 His understanding on Islam often 
invites further controversies among Muslims and some would classify 
him as a neo-modernist thinker.57 Wahid wishes to make non-Muslims 
as citizen whose rights and responsibilities are equal with those 
Muslims, including the right to become the president in a Muslim 
majority country such as Indonesia. He disagrees with those who use 
the Qur’an (Q.S. 3:38) as the basis of their rejection to non-Muslims as 
a head of state, because God says “awliya>” in this verse, which means 
friend or protector, and not “umara>” which means the ruling people. In 
this regard, he compares the situation of the Indonesian politics to that 
of the US, in which everybody, including the people of the color is 
treated equally as their right to become president, despite the fact that 
this has never happened in this country.58  
In gender perspective, Wahid maintains that men and women have 
equal position. This is why they have the same portion in the 
inheritance law on the grounds that the Qur’an (4:11) (li al-dhakari 
mithlu haz}z} al-unthayayn, to the male, a portion equal to that of two 
females) uses the word haz}z} which means destiny or fate indicating a 
qualitative meaning, and it does not use the word nas}b whose meaning 
is quantitative such as one or two. The word haz}z} encompasses rights 
and duties, while the word nas }b encompasses only quantitative share. 
With such an interpretation, Wahid would redefine the inheritance law 
in Islam which stipulates equality between men and women. He also 
reinterprets the Qur’an (4:3) (fa’in khiftum an la > ta‘dilu> fawa>h }idatan, but if 
                                                 
55 Masykuri Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy 
(Hamburg: Abera Verlag Meyer & Co. KG, 1997), p. 73.  
56 For a succinct account of Abdurrahman Wahid’s political ideas and practices, see, 
Mujiburrahman, “Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of 
Abdurrahman Wahid,” Islam and Christian Muslim Relations, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 (Oct 1999), 
pp. 339-52; cf. Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of 
Tolerance (London and New York: Routledge, 1995); cf. Abdurrahman Wahid, Bunga 
Rampai dari Pesantren (Jakarta: Dharma Bakti, 1979). 
57 Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam:Rekonstruksi Pemikiran 
Islam Masa Orde Baru (Bandung: Mizan, 1986), pp. 176-77. 
58 Masykuri Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, p. 104. 
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ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly [with them], then only 
one) in which justice (al-‘adala>) must be decided upon in relation to the 
object which in this case is a woman, and the woman’s view is not 
individual but a general one. Formerly women allowed their husbands 
to take another wife, but now, he believes, most of the women do not 
allow such a practice.59  
With regard to the relationship between Islam and state, Wahid 
argues that Islam should act as a complementary factor for developing 
socio-economic and political system, not as an alternative factor that 
could have a disintegrative impact on life of nation as a whole. He 
notes that the Muslim community has come to accept Pancasila, the 
state philosophy, while at the same time still maintaining its “Islamic” 
way of life in its local and individual variants. Wahid, therefore, does 
not agree to the idealization of Islam as a political system. Instead, he 
suggests a functional view for integrating the universal perception of 
Islam and the national perception of a certain state. He rejects 
formalization of Islam by the state, including religious activities 
initiated and sponsored by the government. He also suggests the 
application of secularization process, in which religion must be treated 
outside the state authority.60 
At the cultural level, Wahid proposes his notion of “pribumisasi 
Islam” (indigenizing Islam) which evoked criticism among the Muslim 
community, because he proposed replacing the Muslim greeting “al-
sala >mu ‘alaykum” (peace be upon you) by Indonesian greetings, such as 
“selamat pagi” (good morning) or “selamat sore” (good evening), and the 
like.61 This does not mean that the Muslim community does not have 
the right to fill the life of the nation-state. Instead, he proposes the 
local contexts as determining factors in understanding Islam. For 
Wahid, democracy is all about take-and-give practice in order to 
maintain the heterogeneity of Indonesia. He is concerned with the 
protection of minority. He is of the critics of the Suharto’s New Order 
regime, and he severely criticized the ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim 
                                                 
59 Ibid, pp. 107-08. 
60 Ibid, pp. 195-96. 
61 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Pribumisasi Islam,” in Muntaha Azhari and Abdul Mun’im 
Saleh (eds.), Islam Menatap Masa Depan (Jakarta: P3M, 1989), p. 81. 
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se-Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) as 
sectarian and perceived it as Suharto’s trojan horse.62  
Wahid’s real endeavor is obvious in developing an open discourse 
on democracy by establishing Fordem (Forum Demokrasi, Forum for 
Democracy).63 This initiative was undertaken by Wahid as a response 
to the hegemony of ICMI in the state and public structures by arguing 
that “the struggle for democracy and justice must take precedence over 
less inclusive concerns, including those of the Muslim community.”64 
Islam, he goes on to argue, should not be idealized so that it is 
regarded as the only ground for democracy, law, or economic justice. 
Rather, Islam should serve as an inspirational base for a national 
framework of a democratic society. Even though Forum Demokrasi 
was not banned, the government showed its displeasure with Wahid’s 
initiative and ideas on democracy. As a consequence, the government 
refused to reappoint him to be an MPR (Majlis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat, The People’s Consultative Assembly) member on October 
1992.65 
Mawdudian Approach 
The Mawdudian approach understands and approaches the 
relationship between Islam and democracy in a somewhat ambiguous 
position: neither rejects nor accepts democracy. Mohammad Natsir, 
one of the most outstanding leaders of the Masyumi, may be classified 
into this camp.66 It is very likely that the genealogy of Natsir’s 
Mawdudian approach to democracy might be traced from the fact that 
both knew one another as a friend.67 This close friendship lends, to 
                                                 
62 For further account on Wahid’s argument in criticizing ICMI, see, Abdurrahman 
Wahid, “Intelektual di Tengah Eksklusifisme,” in Nasrullah Ali-Fauzi (ed.), ICMI: 
Antara Status Quo dan Demokratisasi (Bandung: Mizan, 1995). 
63 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, Indonesia in the 1990s (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
1994), especially pp. 186-193. 
64 Robert W. Hefner, “Islam and Democratization in Indonesia,” in Robert W. Hefner 
and Patricia Horvatich (eds.), Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal 
in Muslim Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), pp. 100-01. 
65 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Indonesia’s Muslim Middle Class: An Imperative or a 
Chioce?,” in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds.), The Politics of Middle Class 
Indonesia (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), p. 29. 
66 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, “Combining Activism and Intellectualism: the Biography of 
Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993),” Studia Islamika, vol. 2, no. 1 (1995), pp. 117-131. 
67 Ibid, p. 218. 
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large extent, a mutual take-and-give intellectual exchange between the 
two. In relation to the relationship between religion and state, for 
instance, Natsir’s view is very much similar to that of Mawdudi: Islam 
must be referred to as the sole foundation of the state.68 In dealing 
with public matters, Natsir suggests that the basic principle upon 
which Muslims must be relied is shu>ra> (public deliberation). The extent 
to which this principle should be implemented, Muslims should render 
to ijtiha>d (independent reasoning, intellectual endeavor), because Islam 
does not provide a stringent and definite blue-print for that.69  
Nevertheless, his view of democracy is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, he accepts democracy in the negative sense that Islam is anti-
istibda>d (despotism), anti-absolutism, and anti-authoritarian which 
conforms to the basic elements of democracy. On the other hand, he 
disagreed if Islam relies too heavily on democracy because it has many 
shortcomings as well. He said that “Islam is neither democracy 100 % 
nor autocracy 100 %, Islam is……. Islam.”70 This is mainly because 
politics is not subject to public deliberation in accord with majority 
vote in the parliament. Any political decision is not insurmountable by 
the h}udu>d (constraints) revealed by God. Therefore, all definite matters 
in Islam cannot be rendered to political deliberation of majority vote 
(a-half-plus-one vote).71 Natsir’s ambiguous position regarding 
democracy can be further seen in his argument that the status of 
democracy in Islam is vital as to give the people freedom of expression 
and criticism so as the power abuse by the government could be 
avoided. Democracy is also vital in that the Muslims have the 
opportunity to make a law which is in line with Islamic teachings.72 In 
an occasion he for example asserts that “….. as far as Islam is 
concerned, democracy is the first priority, because Islam is likely to 
succeed in a democratic system.”73  
                                                 
68 See, for instance, Mohammad Natsir, Islam sebagai Dasar Negara (Bandung: Pimpinan 
Fraksi Masyumi dalam Konstituante, 1957). 
69 Ibid, p. 273. 
70 Mohammad Natsir, Capita Selecta (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1973), p. 452. 
71 Ibid, p. 452. 
72 Ahmad Suhelmi, Polemik Negara Islam (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p. 128. 
73 Cited by Kahin, “Mohammad Natsir,” in Yusuf Abdullah Puar (ed.), Muhammad 
Natsir 70 Tahun: Kenang-kenangan dan Perjuangan (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1978), p. 333. 
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Not until in 1957, in his speech delivered in the Constituent 
Assembly, did Natsir introduce “Theistic Democracy” by which he 
meant as democracy based on divine values.74 This notion was 
reminiscent of Mawdudi’s theory of “theo-democracy” which 
acknowledges only the sovereignty of God.75 What makes Natsir 
different from Mawdudi is that the first has never claimed that 
democracy contains shirk (polytheism) as the latter had done.76 In this 
system, the majority vote must be embarked upon religious values. Any 
public decision rendered to those values can be regarded as ijma>‘ 
(consensus) which is bound to Muslims in any particular time and 
place. Natsir came to the conclusion that the Islamic principle of shu>ra > 
was closer to the formula of modern democracy, with the 
implementation of h}udu>d and religious ethics as its main reference in 
the process of public deliberation.  
Jalaluddin Rakhmat, a vigorous propagator of Shi >‘ah Islam in 
Indonesia, is on the same boat as Natsir’s.77 For Rakhmat, democracy 
is a system of politics which is based on two principles: political 
participation and human rights.78 These principles allow citizens 
participate in public deliberation and protect human rights. This 
concept of democracy is not only identical to Islam, but also the 
highest representation of Islamic teachings in the life of nation-state. 
Nevertheless, Rakhmat argues, the system of politics in Islam is 
incomparable to democracy in the following two points: first, 
democracy is a secular political system which presumes the sovereignty 
                                                 
74 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, “Modernisme Islam dan Demokrasi: Pandangan Politik 
Mohammad Natsir,” Islamika, No. 3 (1994), p. 79. 
75 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante: Islam dan Masalah 
Kenegaraan (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), p. 130. 
76 For more detailed information on Mawdudi, see among others, Charles J. Adams, 
“Mawdudi and the Islamic State,” in John L. Esposito (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam 
(New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 99-133; cf. Seyyed Vali 
Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 
77 M. Syafi’i Anwar classfies Rakhmat as a formalistic Muslim intellectual who seeks a 
stringent devotion to God’s law. See, M. Syafi’i Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam 
Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru (Jakarta: 
Paramadina, 1995), pp. 144-55.  
78 Jalaluddin Rakhmat, “Islam dan Kekuasaan: Aktor atau Instrumen?,” in M. Imam 
Aziz, et. al. (eds.), Agama, Demokrasi dan Keadilan (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1993), pp. 63-75. 
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of people, while Islam acknowledges the sovereignty of God only. It is 
just impossible for the majority vote to alter God’s decision through 
Islamic shari>‘ah. Second, in practice the people’s vote can be 
manipulated, either by means of intimidation or persuasion. 
Democracy’s “vox populi vox Dei” is theologically unfounded in Islam. 
Islam is a unique system which develops the principle of shu>ra> and 
human rights at once.79 
According to Rakhmat, at first when encountering the modern 
world, Islam claims itself as democratic, in which democracy is 
deployed as a means of simplifying the struggle of Islam. This is the 
strategy used to deceive the modern world as if what the ideals of 
political ethics the West wishes is also justifiable in Islam. This strategy 
is particularly helpful for Muslims under the oppression of the West 
and they do not have freedom of expression. Nowadays, Rakhmat 
argues, the context is totally different. Democracy has widely been 
criticized for its shortcomings. Democracy is no longer a revered 
concept. Instead of relying on democracy, Muslims can trust the 
concept of tawh }i >d (the Oneness of God) in overcoming their daily 
matters, since it encompasses more than democracy does. “In tawh }i >d,” 
Rakhmat goes on to argue, “there is freedom of humans, and each 
Muslim individual is not allowed to oppress one another.”80 Different 
from democracy, tawh }i >d implies the sense of divine justice. More 
importantly, “the concept of democracy cannot be found in any 
mu‘tabar (accepted) classical Islamic text-books.”81 Thus, Rakhmat is of 
the proponent of democratic ideals, but democracy as a concept is 
considered unnecessary, since the concept of tawh}i >d is all-
encompassing and more authentic as it is derived from God.  
Qutbian Approach 
The last approach, we might call it Qutbian, has a firm resistance 
to democracy on the grounds that it is derived from the unbelievers’ 
(ka >fir) system which is, therefore, not allowed (h}ara>m) to be adopted by 
Muslims. This approach assumes that a truly Islamic society can only 
be established on the basis of the tenets of the shari>‘ah which alone can 
guarantee freedom and justice to all believers. The shari>‘ah is not 
                                                 
79 Ibid, p. 65. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
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restricted to legal injunctions or to principles of government. The 
shari>‘ah of God, in line with Qutb’s definition, means everything that 
God has decreed to organize all aspects of human life such as the 
principle of faith, the principle of justice, the principles of morality and 
human behavior, the principles of knowledge, the principles of ethics 
and aesthetics.82 In Indonesia, this standpoint is well-represented by 
some radical Islamists both individually and organizationally such as 
MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Muslim Holy 
Warriors Indonesia) and HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Indonesian 
Islamic Party of Liberation). This camp perceives democracy as in 
itself contradictory to Islam, either at general level or at details. The 
contradiction between Islam and democracy can be obviously seen in 
the source of its naissance, its theology that delivers its birth, the 
principle upon which it is based, as well as its ideas and rules it 
produces.83 Democracy is a secular-Western coined term used to 
denote a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. 
People are therefore considered as the absolute ruler and the owner of 
the sovereignty. The right to govern is vested in people themselves and 
they do not account their duties but for themselves. All these notions 
are, according to this camp, in conflict with the idea that the 
sovereignty belongs to God alone which they believe absolutely true.  
According to the proponents of this approach, it is indeed of 
truism that there does exist the principle of shu>ra> (public 
deliberation/consultation) in Islam. In many verses of the Qur’an and 
Muhammad’s sayings Muslims are recommended to conduct shu >ra> in 
dealing with their daily affairs. Likewise, shu >ra> can also be found in 
democracy. Nevertheless, they strongly believe that it is fatally 
erroneous to assume that Islam can be equated with democracy only 
because both contain shu>ra>. Democracy and Islam are extremely 
different to each other. While the first is a system of life revealed by 
God which assumes the sovereignty of God, the latter is human-made 
entity which assumes the sovereignty of people. Democracy represents 
the revolt against God in terms of the process of law making. Due to 
                                                 
82 For a helpful discussion on Qutb’s principle of hakimiyyah, see for example, Yvonne 
Y. Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival,” in John L. Esposito (ed.), 
Voices of Resurgent Islam, especially pp.  89-90. 
83 “Islam, Demokrasi, dan Modernisasi?,” available at: (http://www.hidayatulislam.net-
/comments.php?id=P591_0_1_0_C), accessed on 27 July 2005. 
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this reason, they believe that democracy and Islam will never be able to 
coexist in the hearts of “true” Muslims.84 In short, the attitude of this 
camp towards democracy is as clear as crystal: no compromise with 
democracy, because democracy will only reduce the level of Muslims’ 
faith to Allah.  
In post-New Order Indonesia, democracy has been under serious 
attacks by some Islamists. One severe criticism is from Farid Wadjdi, 
one of the respected belligerent activists of HTI. In one of his articles 
he criticizes democracy as being lack of its very undemocratic nature. 
The freedom guaranteed by democracy is more a myth than a reality. 
In his view, there is no real freedom as such in democracy. The system 
of democracy will allow freedom so long as it does not contradict the 
core values of secularism that can threaten the democracy itself. In this 
regard, Wadjdi refers to the contemporary case of the ban of religious 
symbols and signs in public places such as the controversies of the ban 
of jilba>b (women headscarf) for Muslim school girls and ladies in 
French.85  
Muhammad Shiddiq Al-Jawi is another fervent rejecter of 
democracy. He confronts democracy with his faith in Islam, because 
faith must be used as the standard in approaching everything in this 
world.86 He compares democracy with Islamic faith in light of the 
following five points. First, while democracy is a man-made entity and 
a creation of human intellect, in Islam it is the shari>‘ah, not intellect, 
that must be used as the single reference in rendering final judgment or 
examination. Al-Jawi cites a verse of the Qur’an: “al-h}aki >miyya (the 
right to make a law) belongs to Allah alone” (la > h}ukma illa> li Alla>h) 
(Q.S. 6: 57). Second, democracy separates religion from the state, while 
in Islam both are inseparable and all duties must be conducted based 
on Allah’s rules. Men do not have right to rule themselves. Third, 
while democracy means the sovereignty belongs to the people, in Islam 
the sovereignty belongs to shara>’(Allah is the law maker), not people. 
                                                 
84 Azhari, “Kebebasan yang Merusak,” available at: (http://www.hidayatulislam.net/-
comments.php?id=P591_0_1_0_C), accessed on 27 July 2005. 
85 Farid Wadjdi, “Larangan Jilbab dan Mitos Demokrasi,” Harian Pikiran Rakyat, Senin, 
January, 19, 2004. 
86 Muhammad Shiddiq Al-Jawi, “Haruskah Islam Menerima Demokrasi?,” an 
unpublished paper written in the end of 1994 or the beginning of 1995, as cited by 
Franz Magnis-Suseno SJ, Mencari Sosok Demokrasi: Sebuah Telaah Filosofis (Jakarta: 
Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1995), pp. 30-31.  
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Fourth, while in democracy the principle of majority vote is 
paramount, in Islam this principle is only applicable in technical 
matters in which specific expertise is unnecessary. Fifth, the four types 
of freedom specific to democracy (freedom of faith, expression, 
possession and behavior) are in themselves contradictory to the 
concept of freedom in Islam. Al-Jawi comes to the conclusion that “it 
is fatally erroneous to assert that democracy is a part of Islam…. 
Democracy is not shari>‘ah law; it is human’s invention which is just 
susceptible.”87  
Conclusion 
The extent to which Indonesia has been democratic has become 
one of the most difficult questions to answer. To this question, there 
are a large variety of answers provided by some scientists. If the 
minimum standard is used, i.e. the existence of general election, one 
may categorize Indonesia as a democratic country. By and large, 
Indonesian Islam proves to be compatible with democracy. It is a 
matter of fact that general election has been used as a regular 
mechanism of electing the country’s leaders. Despite the fact that 
Indonesia may be considered as an emerging force among the 
democratic countries, many argued that the country seems to suffer 
from the lack of democratic values. This can be seen from the 
outbreak of horizontal conflicts and socio-political chaos following the 
ouster of Suharto in May 1998. Nevertheless, the point-of-no-return 
movement towards democracy seems to carry on albeit some 
constraints and political resistance. 
In general, there are three different approaches of Indonesian 
Muslims to democracy. The First is Huwaydian approach where 
Muslims view democracy as an intrinsic part of Islam. This approach is 
attributed to Fahmi Huwaydi’s liberal standpoints of democracy that 
Islam and democracy can be considered as two sides of a same coin. 
Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Ra’is are of the 
representation of this approach. Second, Mawdudian approach in 
which Muslims understand the relationship between Islam and 
democracy in a somewhat ambiguous position: neither rejects nor 
accepts democracy. They introduce a middle ground concept of 
“Islamic democracy” or “Islamic theo-democracy” on the basis of 
                                                 
87 Muhammad Shiddiq Al-Jawi, “Haruskah Islam Menerima Demokrasi?,” pp. 4-6. 
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Mawdudi’s well-known concept of Islamic theocracy. Mohammad 
Natsir and Jalauddin Rakhmat are the protagonists of this approach. 
The last approach, the so-called Qutbian, rejects democracy and 
whatever derived from it. Some Islamist groups, be it organizationally 
or individually, might be categorized under this camp, such as MMI 
and HTI. 
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